DOES WAR RESEMBLE A FEAT
What does the notion “feat” stand for? What is its significance for the phenomenon called “war”? The ancient historian Cornelius Tacitus warned us that the counterfeiters of the war-time history conceal disgrace and crime through the concept called “feat”, or else called “an act of heroism”. So, besides anything else the notion can be used for speculation.
During war-time, feat undoubtedly plays a certain role, but is unable to cover the essence of war. At least, for the fact that it always goes hand in hand with its antipodes- betrayal, lack of courage, lack of will and so on.
Judging on principle, feat is a concomitant phenomenon during war, its most brilliant and therefore enticingly emotional aspect.
In May, 2005, the world celebrated the 60th anniversary of the defeat of Hitler Germany. And for the 60th time it remained in the captivity illusory-sensitive, nostalgic evaluations. It is high time, however, for the mankind to abandon the emotional perception of war and try to think it over in a reasonable way.
War has its own logic and is subject to mathematical reasoning. This is its most overlapping face in historical treatises. WWII is no exception of this rule. But logic is only one of the formal, outward sides of war. It also has many external logic steps as dialectic of development, which cannot be revealed by traditional formal logic methods.
Let us take a specific example, in which these two forms are manifested- the formal-logic and the dialectical ones and the ability for them to be perceived and reasonably justified. In his book, “The Memoirs of a Soldier”, Heinz Guderian wrote the following: “According to the documentary papers I have, the 205 German divisions were disposed as follows on 22nd June, 1941: 38 divisions were located in the west (i.e. in France, my note), 12 divisions in Norway, one in Denmark, two in Libya. Only 145 divisions could be used for the eastern campaign (against the USSR, my note).
This distribution of forces testifies about the unnecessary fragmentation- 38 divisions in the west were too many for the region. The same goes for Norway- too many for that region”, the author concludes.
Can the iron German logic be objected? Guderian was no ordinary person. He was one of the emblematic figures from the era of the Third Reich. Colonel-General of the armoured troops, a theorist, i.e. of the German blitz crews, extremely expansive and aggressive… He did not take captives… for they would have interfered with his mobility and cause unnecessary exhaustion. His fierce attack on France in May, 1940, was the main cause for the breakdown of the French resistance that led to the fact that he fuelled his tanks on the roadside petrol stations in the well regulated peaceful, still prosperous country.
Guderian was at the basis of the defeat, which the “Centre” Army group inflicted on the Soviet Western Front. The enormous encirclements around Smolensk and Bryansk, as well as the fighting at Elnya were largely determined by his intense and uncompromising attacks. The precipitous strike of his Second tank group from north to south led to the encirclement and subsequent destruction of five Soviet armies near Kiev and the fall of the city into German hands.
The logic of war is not the logic of politics. Formally viewed, Guderian was right. The dialectic of war, however, is different, and unachievable, as it seems, to the colonel-general, though the lines quoted were written post-facto.
If the processes should be examined in their dynamics and viewed in a complex way, it will become clear that Guderian’s formal logic is no good for our reasoning. Let us assume that Hitler, having bended under the pressure of his generals, had left all the military potential to the needs of the “Eastern March”. Who then, should have secured Germany from the side of Great Britain? That is why 38 divisions were left in the west, 12 in Norway and one in Denmark. According to the calculations of the German military intelligence, the British were able to deploy from 32 to 33 divisions. As a matter of fact, the English potential was lower. At that period of time, England could secure and deploy only 29 divisions. In this case, the mistake that the Abwehr allowed was not so important, but the idea was. With 50-51 divisions Hitler provided, albeit a minimal superiority in number, and firmly clamped the English onto their islands. Thus he gained the advantage to operate all alone against the Russians in the east. There is no reason for us to be misled. Until the Normandy landing in June, 1944, Hitler had not been in a situation of leading a war on two fronts.
Following this kind of reasoning, we could go into the situation further. Let us have a look at the 7 divisions located on the Balkans. With the exception of the formal side- the sanatorium-curative, these divisions had the task of securing the southern wing of the German front from a possible British landing. That was an old, but unfulfilled dream of Winston Churchill’s- the British war-time Prime Minister, dating back to WWI, when the British and him, personally failed in their attempt to land in the Dardanelles of the Gallipoli Peninsula.
One more point may be highlighted, which was unclear to Guderian. These forces actually played the role of a strategic reserve- Germany was not one of the countries that could boast on inexhaustible resources, not to mention demographic ones. So, it was only natural for the battalions to be there, marching eastwards, in order to fill in the decreasing in the intensive fights German parts.
The colonel-general wanted for himself, in the east, all possible forces, because he considered this the way to end up with the Russians in the course of one campaign only. As can be seen, the refusal was quite reasonable, for there was a real possibility for the British to enter Berlin as winners before the entry into Moscow.
The following figures are valid for the Reichstag: for a five-month war-time period 17 322 Soviet war planes, 21 391 tanks, 32 541 cannons were either captured, or destroyed, 3 806 865 Soviet soldiers were captured or killed. Another example: On 11th December, 1941, Hitler reported the number about the officers, too. This number did not include the killed and having somehow escaped. This is no empty boasting. Up to date, the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation generally confirm the aforementioned figures, admitting that for the first five months of the war the Red Army lost about 4 000 000 soldiers and officers, 20 500 tanks captured, 17 900 war planes, 20 000 cannons etc.
That was a classic military disaster. But the picture would be incomplete, unless one more figure is mentioned. As a result of the German offensive, the Soviet Union lost 85 percent of the power of their military-industrial complex. Only 15 percent were left, which produced airplanes, tank ammunition and other military supplies.
With this formally-logic picture outlined, the fate of the Soviet side was pre-destined. In fact, the dialectic of the process development evolved in an entirely different direction. The offensive of the German troops was stopped, the main forces of the enemy were defeated and they were thrown far away from the Soviet capital. This kind of miracle was not to the merit of “General Mud” or “General Winter”, of which the whining German field marshals and generals constantly complained about and blamed for their “lost victories”. Here things go even beyond dialectical objectivity. We are faced with an unclear, for the time being, subjective pre-destination, pre-conceived in long-term perspective.
War, as can be seen, is a rather complex phenomenon, for us to try to break it through our limited sensitiveness. Ultimately, we should ask ourselves the reasonable question what WWII took from man. But we ought to ask another, not less reasonable question- what did man receive from WWII? Was all that about a posture, which feat indeed stands for?
It is easy to deny and condemn war as a phenomenon, to totally reject its existence as such. This is especially valid for WWII with the huge number of sacrifices (more than 50 million), the monstrous destruction and the enormous resources spent on their implementation. And the immeasurable inhuman suffering, the hell into which the earth was transformed! The latter, however, will not stop war, because apart from the above mentioned features- sacrifice, suffering and destruction, it cannot be denied that war creates prerequisites for accelerated, even frantic development of mankind- in scientific, technological, economic and cultural aspects. It cannot be denied that after WWII, the world having recovered from the war as a whole, especially in its advanced part, made such an incredible leap in its development, which was unattainable in the previous centuries. This jump was carried out within a decade. The rest is the result of further development and refinement.
An objective view over the issues discussed shows that mankind needs another, not less shocking war. But it is high time people reasonably thought war over in such a way, that without stopping the mechanisms stimulating development, free it from the accompanying negative phenomena such as sacrifice, destruction, suffering. It is necessary for the new person, the man of reason, to free himself from the dominant emotional perceptions of war to see through the mechanisms that stimulate development.
Comments
No comment yet.