author Vladimir Zrotev
Annotation of the book - Will for war

The book, which I propose to your attention is devoted to certain issues related to World War II. More precisely, this is a study of the prerequisites which led to the outbreak of the largest in the history of human civilization war. I have been working on this problem for a long time. I am quite aware that the topic has been commented on countless times in the the West as well as in the East and overseas. There have been many different interpretations on the nature of the existing factual material.It cannot be denied though, that many questions remain unanswered despite all the available diversity of factual material. I think that I managed to obtain if not the most correct, then at least some very interesting and intriguing answers to the many mysteries of this war, as seen
From another, totally different angle. The basics of this approach puts to revision the forms of traditional thinking in the treatment of war in general as a philosophical category.
The original idea of the book had a limited scope related to the not yet found acceptable explanation to issues such as why, especially after the disclosure about the “Storm” operation, does Stalin allow German troops to Pieter, Moscow and the Caucasus and the Volga shores. And Adolf Hitler himself could have succeeded, without really believing in that.
I will not dwell on the unsoundness of the dominant interpretations / new and old / on the given problem. This is done in detail in the very book “Will for War.” But it cannot be denied that the occupation of such vast areas by the Germans is a weird not only military, but above all political anomaly. This becomes crystal clear in connection with the popular recent disclosures based on developments around the “Storm Operation”, that the Soviet General Staff carried out in conditions of actual war.
In my attempts to find a decent answer to this question, it turned out that the old historical-geographical framework has gotten obsolete and the whole process associated with the preparation and conduct of WW II had to be reviewed. To review, indeed,because both old and modern interpretations have the same relapse-they are too much subject to ideological and political nuances with a kind of mythological flavour, which more conceals, than reveals the true nature of the processes on the verge of the war.This fully applies both to the Western historical tradition, and the Eastern – from the former Soviet-Stalinist one to the present Russian.
In this case it is not possible to avoid scandal, but I put forward reasonable statements refracted through the prism of my personal views about the war as a philosophical category. As they say: Deus ex machina – unexpected solutions.
In this regard it was inevitable to seek the answer of a very important question- what was the actual role of England and France in the processes leading to the outbreak of the war. The actual, rather than the proclaimed one, invented to save the honor of the uniform of the so-called “great powers”, which, unfortunately, in my humble opinion, still serves to our satisfagtion. This approach is totally wrong and generates many misconceptions. I dare say, and illustrate that the role of those two forces is pretty unenviable at the time. And the vigorous rise of the Berlin dictator in an international plan is largely determined by the inability of the West to resist effectively, and has a major influence on the processes and phenomena led to the bloodiest of all wars.
The foreign policy and the related military course that the Nazi state held were analysed in a new, unconventional aspect. A completely new political approach is outlined in which the broad political perimeters seem quite reasonable and are in close relationship with the general idea to which Hitler subordinates his political movement in an international plan. An aim that the German Fuhrer pursued with the typical arrogance characteristic for the well-founded and practised by him National Socialist idea, which he was after till his last days.
Special attention is paid to the role played JV Stalin in the processes leading to war. I am certain that this role is not insignificant and that it is a big mistake to narrow it within the range of stupidity and illiteracy -a recent approach hinting that the Soviet ruling class, led by its leader is mainly composed of morons.No need to say that is a quite comfortable, but absolutely ludicrous approach.It is clear that neither Stalin, nor the people from his entourage were fools, though statements of a similar nature have been pushed forward recently-I. Bunich for example. This inevitably has an impact on the traditional inability to find a meaningful response to the creation of the so-called Great Patriotic War and the so-called Soviet peoples in the early years of the war.The “Storm Operation is meticulously looked upon,which appears to be a powerful lever in Stalin’s hands to influence the war and pre-war processes. Powerful, but without any real chance for effective action application, because this algorithm is done in perfect unison with the other goals and objectives and is the only, although the largest of the known political provocations and hence has a purely disinformative nature.However Stalin’s role in these processes is not fully clarified and his real purpose either. They are of a quite large scale and devastatingly immoral and cynical, so they will be given special attention in a separate study that will ultimately result in response to the question raised above about the initial success of Germany in the East. This book is limited to address and focus our attention on the irrationality and incomprehensibility of Stalin’s proclaimed aspirations in an international aspect. Such processes cannot be explained by simple stupidity and ignorance, qualities that have recently been attached to the Chief of the nations.
The second book will consider the core of the notorious Stalinist repressions which in fact go far beyond the ordinary framework about the already rejected idea connected with the paranoia of the Soviet leader,as well as the insatiable thirst for power and authority of the Owner, as Stalin was called by his people. All, however, clearly shows that Stalin puts forward other, higher goals and that is why it is difficult for him to be squeezed into the limits of the traditional thinking. What is the nature of these higher goals and to what extent they are cynical is for the time being a mystery for the author.
This book, devoted primarily to the processes leading to the outbreak of World War II as a political phenomenon also includes the processes in the initial period of the war, up to the decisive clash in the East. In the focus of attention is the issue why the main conflict is in the East and in the West that conflict is of a preparatory, even preventive nature.
The old, politically and ideologically laden historical concepts characteristic of the preceding stages are subject to critical analysis. Also the most modern ones which also suffer from an inability to explain the simple, but with fundamental issues related to the so-called “weird war” , the defeat of France – Europe’s political and military colossus that literally almost without resistance, gave in within a few weeks at the mercy of the victorious this time Nazi Reich, are considered too. The inability of Britain to effectively oppose Hitler not only politically in the preparations for the war, but then in the course of the actual war in North Africa as well as the vitally important for the British Empire Mediterranean region are also commented on. The incapacity of the British led to their purely partisan in nature activities acts of the naval fleet of His Majesty the King of England.
Particular attention is paid to the mythology concocted about World War II, which literally congested both Western and Eastern historiography. New myths appeared in connection with the treatment of this war.
While considering the political combinations that were contemplated by the German Fuhrer and the role of the Axis Rome-Berlin-Tokyo, the distribution of tasks among the Allies have been analyzed. In particular, it addressed the question of with what purpose the Japanese state in 1941, soared surprisingly to the south of the Pacific, not the rear of the Soviet Union. The true role that is assigned to Japan in the political combinations of the German Fuhrer is revealed and the nature of the tasks which the Land of the Rising Sun has to tackle have been viewed.
The actual, not the propagated U.S. role in these processes has been shown. The problems that conflict with dully preached truths have been marked. A deeper revealing of the nature of the processes may be the subject of a profound further investigation.
The main achievement of “Will for War” is not its factually-savoury flavour, although such aspects cannot be dismissed. The book aims primarily to examine the processes that led to certain events,according to the specifics of history as a philosophical science.For example answers have been sought to the mystery which even now strikes the minds of historians and fans of the issue – why Hitler “most unexpectedly” stops its troops up to Dunkirk during the French campaign in 1940,or the importance of the Cretan operation of the Wehrmacht and the whole German campaign in the Balkans.The actual, rather than taken as the actual nature of the German military operations in North Africa under the command of Edwin Rommel, given that Hitler expressed no appetite in the region, nor anxious he was to be faithful and willing to sacrifice an ally. A focus for reflection. In the spring of 1941 Hitler was able to devote more of his three divisions, bearing the name of “Africa Corpus”,with which he was supposed to crush the British forces covering Egypt and lay hands on the Suez without without being so much affected about his preparation for the Eastern campaign, which began only in summer. Why? Hardly had he expected such furious opposition from the British. The development of hostilities in the region during the same spring, and later on do not speak in favor of the vaunted British stoicism. The book demonstrates an innovative approach that makes it possible possible to clarify a number of issues that until now pass to the offensive to modern science label”incomprehensible.”
In the book, which in its essence is of a philosophical and historical nature, criticizes wellknown theories related to the problem as well as their authors. As for the historical events and historical personages associated with them, the method of detecting the nature of the processes and their driving forces is applied both on objective and subjective grounds. And the reader is left with the responsibility to direct their thoughts to the perception of the processes in positive or negative terms, which in fact is another aspect of history. The idea is never to suggest ready perceptions, which in fact ideologists try to do.
The book consists of two parts. The first covers the period from 1939 to 1940 and concerns such matters as the preparation, the stages of the war, related not only to purely military training – the militarization of their main opposing factors, but primarily political preparation this war such as the Anschluss of Austria, the Munich agreement, the response and the real possibilities of the various European countries to influence the ongoing processes in this period. This part consists of 13 chapters – 176 pages.
The second part, which consists of 7 chapters – 142 pages, discusses the problems associated with immediate implementation of the basic conflict in the East.It is chronologically oriented: the second half of 1940 and primarily the first half of 1941 Here the main characters are Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler.