It is generally accepted that the fear of the spread of the Bolshevik revolution in Europe pushed the so-called “great powers” to intervene, which ignited the fire of the civil war in Russia in 1918 .

In fact, the victorious Western nations wanted to use the critical situation in Russia to control Russia’s appetizing markets and rich sources of raw materials. They relied on a quick and easy victory, but their ambitions were quickly scorched and they ingloriously gave up direct military participation. On the other hand, they began pouring resources into the white movement. The grocer’s urge turned out to be a double-edged sword.

Indeed, the British and French in the west, and the Americans and Japanese in the east, managed to supply huge quantities of military equipment to various types of white movements, but they did not receive much benefit in the end. In turn, however, this slowed the transition of their economies from military to peaceful rails, especially among the Western winners. In this way, their lag in development deepened, which undermined their hegemonic status. In addition, once they had made a moral commitment to white movements, they had to take care of them after their defeat. As insignificant as this logistics may seem (at first glance), it led to a deepening of the crisis effects of post-war adaptation.